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THE NEW LEGAL CRITICISM 
Robin West* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professors Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman’s article Just 
Relationships1 is a fundamental reinterpretation of the moral ideals of large 
swaths of private law. Its significance, however, may go beyond even that 
broad ambition. In this Response, I suggest that Just Relationships is also 
an exemplar—perhaps par excellence—of an emergent form of critical 
discourse, which may itself foreshadow a paradigm shift in contemporary 
critical legal scholarship. That new form of scholarship might usefully be 
dubbed “the new legal criticism.” The label serves partly as an echo of 
the “New Criticism” movement that emerged in literary criticism in the 
middle of the twentieth-century, which, in methodological ways, the new 
legal criticism very much resembles.2 But primarily, the label “new legal 
criticism” suggests that this ascendant group of legal scholars articulates a 
different point of departure for critical thinking about law—particularly 
for critical thinking about private law—from that which most 
immediately preceded it in twentieth century legal thought: the critical 
legal studies movement.3 
Part I describes new legal criticism and compares it with the critical 
legal scholarship movements of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Part II 
further expands my claim that Just Relationships is a good exemplar of the 
new legal criticism by looking at the roles played by relational justice in 
Dagan and Dorfman’s explication of their jurisprudential claims. Part III 
looks at the limits of new legal criticism, again as exemplified by Just 
Relationships. I will explore whether the reliance of the new legal 
criticism on law itself in the development of the idea of justice limits 
                                                                                                                           
 *.  Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law 
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 1.  Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 
(2016). 
 2.  For a classic introduction and critique of the New Critics, see Terry Eagleton, 
Literary Theory: An Introduction 40–42 (2008). 
 3.  See generally Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987) [hereinafter 
Kelman, Critical Legal Studies] (interpreting the major contributions of the critical legal 
studies movement, including legitimation, indeterminacy, and hegemony); Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983) (asserting and defending 
a radical role for lawyers and legal scholars in reforming law toward social change); Robert 
W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in The Politics of Law: A 
Progressive Critique 641 (David Kairys ed., 1998) [hereinafter Gordon, Some Critical 
Theories of Law] (exploring the role of legitimation critiques that centers them from 
Marxist and radical instrumentalist interpretations of law and capitalism). 
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its potency as a form of criticism by comparing the authors’ discussion 
of discrimination in housing with a subject they do not address, at-will 
employment. Finally, the conclusion explores possible avenues of 
further exploration within the authors’ chosen field—private law, 
largely understood—and within the parameters set by the new legal 
criticism’s premises. 
 I. NEW LEGAL CRITICISM AND THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: 
ONE CONTRAST 
The political valence of the new legal criticism is largely shared with 
its critical precursor. The new legal critics, therefore, much like the 
critical legal studies scholars of the late-twentieth century, resist the 
traditional and quasi-libertarian legalist claims that contemporary 
Western law—or at least U.S. private law—rests and should rest on a firm 
commitment to formal equality and an anti-state-interventionist and pro-
market form of individualism. These conventional claims are twofold: 
that contract, tort, and property law collectively constitute a legal 
structure within which (1) norms of equality are exhausted by a shallow 
commitment to the formally equal treatment of all regardless of identity 
or context, and (2) our ideals of liberty are likewise exhausted by a 
conviction that the state should fundamentally stay out of the way of our 
private interactions and private life, beyond minimal night-watchman-like 
norms of tort and criminal law.4 Both critical groups, in short, have a lot 
of shared ground—they share a resistance to the dominant libertarian 
interpretations of our inherited private law texts. 
Beyond those shared political impulses, however, the new legal 
critics’ departure from critical legal scholars’ premises are both deep and 
broad, spanning method, substance, and a range of distinctively 
jurisprudential commitments. Starting with method and substance, on 
the most obvious level, the new legal critics have no commitment to—
indeed, seemingly no interest in—the various versions of the 
indeterminacy thesis, deconstructionist methodology, Marxist or neo-
Marxist “rights critiques,” or Gramscian-styled worries over legitimation 
costs, hegemony, or demystification that so dramatically colored critical 
thinking about liberal legalism from the late 1970s to approximately the 
mid-aughts of this century.5 Thus, the new critics’ various arguments 
                                                                                                                           
 4.   For a clear articulation and defense of this libertarian conception of private law, 
see generally Randy Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (1998) 
(defending a libertarian understanding of contract, property, and the role of courts in 
enforcing the rule of law). 
 5.  On critical legal scholars’ interest in deconstructionist methods, see generally 
Pierre Schlag, A Brief Survey of Deconstruction, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 741 (2005). For 
exemplary and near-iconic examples of the power of the deconstruction method in 
exposing law’s indeterminacy, see, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of 
Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale L.J. 997, 1002–03 (1985); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. 
L. Rev. 293, 299 (1984) [hereinafter Kelman, Trashing]; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure 
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against libertarian interpretations of our legalist commitments are 
decidedly not that those interpretations---or the legal commitments that 
are their subject---are incoherent because they are indeterminate,6 or that 
they vacillate between various polarities that stand in need of 
deconstruction,7 or that the rights at their center serve to legitimate an 
unjust maldistribution of material resources, or that they create a false 
hegemony between classes of contractors, citizens, or neighbors under 
the obfuscating claims of a universalist conception of free actors.8 And, 
most importantly in Dagan and Dorfman’s article, the new legal critics, 
unlike the critical legal scholars, harbor no objection to the traditional 
liberal understanding of the so-called “private–public” distinction.9 New 
legal critics particularly reject the quintessential critical legal scholars’ 
claim that “private law” is a kind of malign illusion: the claim that, at 
best, “private law” is a branch of public regulatory law disingenuously 
committed to the assertion that it is distinctively different from the public 
law regimes of which it is a part; or that, at worst, “private law” rests on a 
destructive denial of the regressive consequences of the false belief that a 
private sphere of individual liberty and freedom, created by a legal 
regime of law and rights, justifies the maldistribution of political power 
that it then disingenuously protects from public critique or political 
change.10 New legal critics resist, in other words, the claims---common 
to most and possibly all of the critical legal scholars’ theoretical 
contributions in the last part of the twentieth century---that the 
“private sphere” regulated by “private law” in order to protect 
individual liberty and privacy within that sphere, either does not exist 
or necessarily serves pernicious ends.11 
                                                                                                                           
of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 209, 211 (1979); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
Harv. L. Rev. 781, 793 (1983). The new legal critics, by contrast, have to date evidenced no 
commitment to the existence of fundamental contradictions or pervasive indeterminacy in 
law, or the potency of deconstructivist methodology in criticism. 
 6.  See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, supra note 5, at 293–94. 
 7.  See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 5, at 1002–03. 
 8.  See, e.g., Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law, supra note 3, at 646. 
 9.  See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1424. 
 10. Id. On the critical legal scholars’ view of the public–private distinction, see 
generally Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Stages of Decline]; Louis Michael 
Seidman, Critical Constitutionalism Now, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 575, 578 (2006). 
 11. The critique of the public–private distinction as either illusory or pernicious 
dates from the legal realist era. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. 
L. Rev. 553, 564 (1933); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 10 
(1927); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
Colum. L. Rev. 809, 816–17 (1935); Leon Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise, 38 Tex. 
L. Rev. 257, 262 (1960); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 474 (1923). 
   As Dagan and Dorfman correctly note, the critique of the public–private 
distinction has become a defining staple of the critical legal scholarship from the early 
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There is, however, a more significant, and possibly more lasting, 
jurisprudential divide between the critical legal scholarship of the 
twentieth century and the new legal criticism of the twenty-first that 
overshadows even these methodological and substantive divides. It 
concerns, broadly, the relationships assumed by the two groups between 
law, politics, and morality. Put briefly, the new legal critics embrace 
various moral principles, which are themselves imperfectly articulated in 
positive law, as the basis of their legal criticism or as constituting the 
baseline against which their criticisms are mounted.12 Therefore, 
according to the new legal critics, law is to be criticized on the basis of 
moral principles and ethical ideals that emanate from law itself.13 The 
twentieth-century critical legal scholars, by contrast, aggressively 
eschewed moral criticism of law of any sort, but particularly when the 
                                                                                                                           
1980s to the present. See, e.g., Kelman, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 3, at 198–99 
(discussing the role of the critique of the private–public distinction in critical legal 
studies); Dalton, supra note 5, at 1010–11 (deconstructing this distinction between private 
and public in contract law); Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private 
Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 Buff. L. Rev. 237, 247–50 (1987) (critiquing this 
distinction in various doctrinal areas of law); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the 
Public/Private Distinction, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 10–42 (1992) (discussing feminist critiques 
of this distinction); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423, 1426–27 (1982) (tracing the history of the purported distinction); Karl 
E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358, 1361–62 
(1982) (discussing the role of this distinction in labor law); Fran Olson, The Family and 
The Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983) 
(attacking the distinction between intimate and private spheres and the distinction 
between both with the public sphere); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1151 (1985) (tracing and critiquing the history of the claim that law is political). 
 12. The idea that moral criticism of law should be grounded in premises themselves 
drawn from law can be traced to natural law theoretical approaches to law’s criticisms and 
to some strands of liberal legalism as well. For natural law antecedents, see generally 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978) (drawing moral principles from the body 
of existing law and looking to advance law on the basis of those principles); John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights 18–19 (2011) (arguing for a moral basis of legal criticism). 
For more contemporary examples of this sort of overtly moralistic approach to legal 
criticism, see, e.g., Paul Gowder, The Rule of Law in the Real World 7–27 (2016) (arguing 
for a dignitarian basis for the rule of law); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights 14 
(2014) (arguing that dignity is both a principle of morality and law); Robin West, Caring 
for Justice (1999) (arguing for a normative approach to law that blends an ethic of care 
with an ethic of justice); Robin West, Normative Jurisprudence (2011) (making the 
argument for a normative approach to legal criticism); Michelle Madden Dempsey, Why 
We Are All Jurisprudes (or, at Least, Should Be), 66 J. Legal Educ. 29, 35 (2016) (arguing 
that law provides general moral obligations on people regardless of whether general moral 
normative forces actually exist); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive 
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 Emory L.J. 815, 817 
(2007) (arguing that traditional morality governing sexual expression promotes inequality 
amongst men and women and unrightfully influences law); Benjamin C. Zipursky & John 
C.P. Goldberg, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917, 919 (2010) (arguing that tort law 
should be understood as a body of law providing remedies for wrongs). 
 13. See, e.g., Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1399 (defining morality in private 
law dealing with interpersonal concerns). 
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moral principles grounding the criticism were purportedly articulated 
in the law itself.14 Moral principles and whatever can be said of them, 
according to the critical legal scholars, simply cannot be the basis for 
the criticism of law mainly because they can and should be subjected to 
the same critiques as law itself: Moral principles are incoherent, 
contradictory, expressed often in terms of moral or human rights that are 
then captured by dominant economic interests, and are basically overly 
protective of property, wealth and entitlement.15 The critical legal scholars’ 
critique of law proceeded, then, not on the basis of law’s relation to its own 
ideals, or to any other set of moral principles, but rather on the basis of 
law’s various relations to power.16 Thus, for the critical legal scholars, law 
could and should be unmasked, deconstructed, and criticized, not 
because it falls short of a moral ideal, but rather because it embodies, 
legitimates, renders invisible, or promotes various forms of social, 
economic, or legal power.17 It should be noted that law could also, at 
least on occasion, be applauded. But again, this would be along the same 
axis: When law is good, it is not because it is morally “good,” but rather 
because it can be deployed in such a way as to either empower generally 
subordinated groups, to explode constellations of pre-existing power, or 
to renegotiate power along surprising and generative axes. The mode of 
either criticism or praise, however, was (or is) for critical legal scholars, 
relentlessly political, not moral: Law stands fundamentally in some 
intimate relation to power, and it is toward the end of better 
understanding, or unmasking, or upending that relation of law to power 
that critique should be aimed.18 The moral criticism of law—and 
particularly moral criticism of law on the grounds that it ill-serves 
laudatory ideals that are themselves imperfectly expressed and embodied 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See, e.g., Kelman, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 3, at 42 (noting the different 
critical views on the theory of law); Kennedy, Stages of Decline, supra note 10, at 1352 
(noting the washing away of the public–private distinction). 
 15. See, e.g., Unger, supra note 3, at 107 (suggesting a basic reformulation of the 
social theory). 
 16. In this, the critical legal scholars echoed Foucault. See generally Michel Foucault, 
The Subject and Power, 8 Critical Inquiry 777 (1982) (arguing that human beings are 
made subjects by exercises of power, and for the need for a new study of the economy of 
power relations). For a full discussion, see Robin West, Critical Legal Studies—The Missing 
Years, in Normative Jurisprudence: An Introduction 177 (2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769, 769–72 (noting 
the shortcomings of utility arguments in traditional law and economic opinions); Duncan 
Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Studies, in Left Legalism/Left Critique 178 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., Duke Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter Kennedy, Critique 
of Rights] (abandoning the Marxist critique of rights and shifting the argument for the 
critique of rights from a claim that rights are contrary to the interests of the party of 
humanity to a political critique that rights freeze political contestation); Catherine A. 
MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 321, 323 (1984) (providing a feminist 
critique on  the politics of pornography law). 
 18. For two powerful examples, see Kennedy, Critique of Rights, supra note 17, at 
178; MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 323. 
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in law itself—is at best a distraction and at worst complicit in law’s 
legitimating and obfuscating projects. The moral calculus required to get 
such criticism off the ground is itself a part of the intellectual and 
cultural apparatus in need of critique. The new legal critics, by contrast, 
harbor no such global moral skepticism. 
Thus, the shared premises of the growing number of new legal 
critics suggests a departure from both traditionally liberal and libertarian 
understandings of large swaths of our law and from the critiques of that 
liberal understanding that have emanated from the various critical legal 
studies movements of the eighties and nineties. The new legal critics, 
unlike their critical predecessors, put forward unabashedly moral 
criticisms of law and of traditionally liberal and libertarian 
justifications of it, and then offer reinterpretations that are grounded 
neither in judicial biography, nor in indeterminacy, nor in reader-
centered politics, but rather in ideals drawn from their faithful reading 
of the law itself.19 We can see this “new” (in some ways of course very old) 
overall approach to the moral criticism of law emerging across an array 
of doctrinal areas. To take just a few salient examples: Fourteenth 
Amendment law, from a new critical perspective, according to Professors 
Reva Siegel and Robert Post, is committed to a substantive (rather than 
formal) conception of equality that is in turn informed by the mandate 
to treat all citizens with dignity and mutual respect—a demand that 
requires much more state intervention than the simplistic or shallow 
mandate to treat likes alike or simply get out of our private or 
commercial affairs.20 Tort law, according to Professors Benjamin 
Zipursky and John Goldberg, is not committed to the goal of efficiently 
allocating the costs of accidents, as argued by now countless liberal, 
libertarian, and economics-minded torts theorists.21 Rather, our “law of 
wrongs” is and should be committed to the mandate that the state must 
provide legal recourse for those who are wronged by co-citizens in 
injurious ways that could and should have been prevented. Tort law itself 
serves this noble, not ignoble, end when properly construed.22 A third 
example: Our contracts—or at least our contracts that are enforceable in 
courts of law and properly enforced—must be conscionable, and not just 
efficient, according to Professors Seana Shiffrin and Hila Keren, and 
                                                                                                                           
 19. See Dworkin, supra note 12, at 46 (noting that moral principles are drawn from 
the body of law itself); Gowder, supra note 12, at 7–27 (suggesting a dignitarian 
understanding of rule of law drawn from law); Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1398 
(noting that moral principles for private law are drawn from law itself); Zipursky & 
Goldberg, supra note 11 (arguing for a conception of torts that conceives of torts as 
wrongs and one in which the concept of wrongs is taken from tort law itself). 
 20. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 425 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s use of a 
minimalist approach to reproductive rights rather than democratic constitutionalism, 
which embraces those rights). 
 21. Zipursky & Goldberg, supra note 12, at 917--30. 
 22. Id. at 931. 
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when they are not, contract law and the judges who enforce it should 
stand ready to strike them.23 A final example: The rule of law itself, 
according to Professor Paul Gowder, commits the state that abides by it to 
the substantive equality and equal dignity of all citizens, including most 
profoundly the poor.24 The rule of law is neither reducible to a call for 
formal equality, as held by liberal theorists, nor is it a handmaiden of 
capitalist exploitation, as contended by Professor Morton Horwitz 
(following Marx) and scores of like-minded neo-Marxist critical 
theorists.25 
All of the aforementioned new legal critics, and again a growing 
number of others, are finding explicitly moral and for-the-most-part 
progressive ideals in all of these old legalistic wine bottles: the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the cases and statutes that constitute contract 
and tort law, and most vividly perhaps, the liberal philosophical and 
political canon that comprises our understanding of the rule of law itself. 
All of these legal scholars—Professors Siegel, Post, Keren, Shiffrin, 
Zipursky, Goldberg, and Gowder—are finding in law a source, rather 
than an object, of politically progressive and morally informed critique. 
Just Relationships is exemplary of this new movement for two related 
reasons. First, it is much more explicit than most participants in this 
genre in detailing the “new critical” moral and philosophical premises 
on which its critique rests. Second, and relatedly, it is simply more 
jurisprudentially ambitious than most of the examples cited above.26 
Dagan and Dorfman seek no less than a reorientation of private law in its 
entirety, from top to bottom, rather than any particular field or doctrine 
within it. And their central positive claim is powerful: All of private law 
exists, they argue, so as to promote a particular kind of justice—what 
                                                                                                                           
 23. Hila Keren, Guilt-Free Markets? Unconscionability, Conscience, and Emotions, 
2016 BYU L. Rev. 427, 438–39 (discussing the centrality of the unconscionability doctrine 
in a court’s enforcement of a contract); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, 
Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205, 249–50 (2000) 
(arguing that the unconscionability doctrine can coexist with a non-paternalistic 
interpretation of the law). 
 24. See Gowder, supra note 12, at 6, 143–57 (“When a state achieves the rule of law, it 
achieves a commitment to equality among its citizens.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Dagan and Dorfman situate their approach to private law by contrasting it with 
the critique of the public–private divide and the liberal and libertarian understanding of 
private law as serving the ends of individual freedom. Thus, it is an understanding of the 
point of private law in its entirety as serving ideally the ends of just relationships. In this 
way, the work compares with Dworkin’s ambition. See Dworkin, supra note 12, at 46 
(arguing that strong legal interpretations must fit both precedent and a strong theory of 
justice). The other new legal critics have not, for the most part, embarked on this 
jurisprudential analysis, but they are more typically focused on particular areas of 
doctrine. Cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. 
L. Rev. 708, 709–13 (2007) (focusing on the unconscionability doctrine, not just private 
law in general); Zipursky & Goldberg, supra note 12, at 918 (arguing that the study of tort 
law, rather than private law in general, has gone astray). 
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they call relational justice—in private relationships.27 Against the 
traditionalists, which for Dagan and Dorfman include both liberal-
egalitarians and liberal, efficiency-minded libertarians, their distinctive 
claim is that relational justice requires two moral goals the traditionalists 
sleight, ignore, or deny: first, a form of substantive, rather than solely 
formal, equality that is in turn sensitive to the contingency, the context, 
and the vulnerabilities of individual contractors and tortfeasors;28 and 
second, a robust autonomy that accords individuals the material 
wherewithal to truly guide their own lives on the basis of their chosen 
conception of the good, rather than a shallow libertarian conception of 
individual independence from the state.29 Their evidence for this broad-
based reinterpretation of our existing law of contract, tort, and property, 
away from the liberal understandings shared by liberal egalitarians and 
libertarians both, comes not from judicial biography or history, nor from 
a frank recital of their own political beliefs, but rather, from private law 
itself: the common law cases and the statutory schemes that form the 
bulk of modern contract, tort, and property doctrine.30 
And against critical legal scholars, Dagan and Dorfman put forward 
two claims: first, that private law most decidedly exists, as does the private 
sphere it protects and regulates; and second, that private law’s existence 
is a good thing. Private law has distinctive positive value that merits 
attention and care—it promotes relational justice.31 If we lose it, we will 
lose the guardian protector of justice in our relational lives.32 The claims 
that private law exists and that it does so in order to promote relational 
justice in our private lives are not simply the result of either mistaken 
understanding or a more malign masking of private power.33 We need to 
understand private law for what it is, as well as for what it could and 
should be, because of the distinctive values it protects and the forms of 
private justice it promotes.34 
II. RELATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACT 
In The Great Gatsby, Tom Buchanan says to Wilson: “I won’t sell you 
the car at all . . . . I’m under no obligations to you at all.”35 Dagan and 
Dorfman do not discuss The Great Gatsby. Nevertheless, their central 
intuition can be applied to this quintessential American novel: Tom 
                                                                                                                           
 27. Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1424. 
 28. See id. at 1399–1400. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 1430–59. 
 31. See id. at 1409–10, 1428. 
 32. See id. at 1410. 
 33. See id. at 1408. 
 34. See id. at 1403–05. 
 35. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby 90 (Matthew J. Bruccoli ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991) (1922). 
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Buchanan was wrong in the novel’s pivotal conversation to disavow all 
obligations to Wilson on the grounds of a lack of contractual privity 
between the two of them. Our private relationships, Dagan and Dorfman 
argue, and particularly those that arise from our commercial lives, 
impose upon us a duty of “relational justice.” Relational justice should 
inform, guide, and restrain our relationships with each other.36 
Relational justice, in turn, requires of us that we respect the substantive 
equality and the capacity for individual self-determination in our 
dealings with each other.37 That, in turn, sometimes (though admittedly 
not always) requires a sensitivity to the context and the particular 
vulnerabilities of the others with whom we deal.38 A respect for the 
formal equality of all contractors, or for all potential tort victims, and an 
equally formal commitment to state detachment, are woefully inadequate 
to those ends.39 
Private law, in turn, reflects and enforces these obligations, albeit 
imperfectly, and provides remedies for their most egregious breach. 
Contract law imposes upon us a wide array of obligations to treat justly 
those with whom we contract, as well as those with whom we may 
contract.40 Tort law imposes an obligation to treat justly those strangers 
or others with whom we come into incidental contact, including 
primarily an obligation to avoid accidental harm.41 Often that obligation 
is fulfilled through respecting the formal equality of each contractor or 
individual tort victim: I need not consider the individual circumstances 
of the buyer of my home or car when setting my asking price, and I need 
not consider the individual limitations or capacities of every stranger 
when fulfilling my obligation to proceed nonnegligently down my 
neighborhood streets in my automobile.42 Thus, formal equality toward 
my contractual partners and a formal commitment to liberty that is 
unburdened by attention to the individuating circumstances of those I 
might accidentally harm is typically sufficient to ensure that I am 
behaving justly in my relational life.43 Consensual contracts, after all, do 
for the most part leave both parties better off, and obligations of due 
care defined generally, rather than individually, do for the most part 
keep all of us out of harm’s way while allowing us to pursue our own 
projects.44 
But formal equality and a formal commitment to liberty that pays no 
attention to individuating circumstances is not always enough to ensure 
                                                                                                                           
 36. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1421–22. 
 37. See id. at 1423. 
 38. See id. at 1433–34. 
 39. See id. at 1435. 
 40. See id. at 1430. 
 41. See id. at 1431. 
 42. See id. at 1421–22. 
 43. See id. at 1438. 
 44. See id. at 1404. 
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relational justice. Our private law, to its credit, reflects this limitation. To 
treat our co-contractors as the substantive equals they are, we must also 
sometimes take account of the possibility that, for individuating reasons, 
they are acting under duress and unable to adequately assess their own 
self-interest, or that the terms we have formally agreed upon are 
nevertheless operating unconscionably upon them, or that they may lack 
the maturity to best determine sensible contract terms.45 To treat all of 
our co-citizens as worthy of self-determination, we must sometimes 
adjust upward the amount of due care we owe to account for their 
particularizing vulnerabilities when those vulnerabilities are obvious 
and debilitating. Relational justice requires us to abide by these legal 
constraints.46 Our law, for the most part, reflects these demands. It is 
private law’s ability to do so, Dagan and Dorfman argue, that is its 
normative point and moral value—not private law’s contributions to 
efficiency or societal wealth. Of course it creates wealth, and of course it 
allows us to create wealth through our dealings.47 To the extent that it 
does so consistently with the demands of justice—that we respect the 
substantive equality and capacity for self-determination of others in our 
dealings with them—those wealth-maximizing dealings and the law 
regulating them are also just. When justice requires more, though, the 
law should, and for the most part does, follow, even at substantial cost to 
wealth and liberty.48 
The law does not, however, perfectly reflect the demands of 
relational justice, and when it falls short, it should be faulted.49 Therein 
lies the foundation of legal critique, both generally and in private law. 
One of Dagan and Dorfman’s examples perfectly illustrates both the 
strengths and the limits of not only their own argument but of new legal 
criticism quite generally. 
Dagan and Dorfman argue in an extended portion of their article 
that, contrary to the claims of virtually all contract scholars, both 
egalitarian and libertarian, relational justice imposes constraints upon us 
in our choice of contracting partners and that those constraints are only very 
imperfectly—if at all—reflected in contract law.50 For this fact, contract 
law should be criticized.51 Contract law, to the contrary, rests quite 
fundamentally on a norm of absolute contractual discretion, in our 
decisions over who we wish to contract with or wish to avoid. This is 
                                                                                                                           
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 1396 (“Private law—the law of our horizontal interventions—offers many 
instrumental benefits to society: Property and contract law help us assign and reassign 
entitlements, while tort law helps allocate responsibilities regarding those entitlements.”). 
 48. See id. at 1397–98. 
 49. See id. at 1424 (noting the extent of the compliance of the doctrine with relational 
justice is contingent and complex). 
 50. See id. at 1419–20. 
 51. See id. 
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wrong, Dagan and Dorfman argue. Our choices are not at all free, either 
morally or legally. They are constrained, first, by the contingent yet 
powerful antidiscrimination norm, which is itself grounded in public 
law.52 By virtue of various familiar civil rights laws, we may not decline to 
sell our home, or refuse to hire someone, on the basis of that potential 
co-contractor’s race, ethnicity, or sex.53 We cannot opt to not deal with 
Black or Latino or female buyers of our homes or potential employees of 
our businesses. We do not in fact have that unfettered contractual 
freedom. We do not have it, of course, by virtue of the existence of 
antidiscrimination law.54 
That legal restraint on our contractual freedom, however, as Dagan 
and Dorfman insist, is “contingent,” and by contingent, they mean 
something quite specific (and contingent might not be the best word for 
this): The existence of the duty not to discriminate in choosing 
contractual partners is contingent not on contract law itself but rather on 
federal civil rights laws.55 But it should not be. Dagan and Dorfman’s 
main point, in brief, in this section of their article, is that we cannot 
discriminatorily refuse to deal with members of these groups, not only by 
virtue of contingent, could-be-otherwise, public-law-based 
antidiscrimination law, but also by virtue of the demands of relational 
justice itself.56 Were we to discriminate against potential homebuyers on 
the basis of race or other impermissible bases, they argue, we would 
violate not just public-law-imposed antidiscrimination law but we would 
also violate our obligations of just dealings. To refuse to contract on these 
grounds would be to refuse to treat those with whom we would not 
contract as substantively equal persons who possess rights to self-
determination that are the equal of our own. It is thus not only federal 
antidiscrimination law but also relational justice that constrain us from 
discriminating against potential contracting partners. To discriminate in 
the sale of our house or to discriminate in our employment practices is a 
violation of our obligations to treat others justly in our private dealings 
with them—not just a violation of the civil rights of members of minority 
groups to nondiscrimination.57 
However, this account of the violation of the duty of relational 
justice that is occasioned by discriminatory conduct in our decision to 
contract or not contract with someone is nowhere reflected in our 
contract law.58 It is not in any sense a violation of contract law—or indeed 
                                                                                                                           
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 1460. 
 54. See id. at 1442–45 (arguing traditionalists’ understanding ascribes the duty of 
nondiscrimination in the sale of a home to the contingent existence of antidiscrimination 
law, whereas the theory of just relationships grounds it in contract and property law itself). 
 55. See id. at 1414. 
 56. See id. at 1399. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 1401–02. 
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of private law—to refuse to hire someone, or sell to someone, on the 
basis of race, gender, or the existence of a disability. To reiterate, while it 
is most assuredly a violation of our public law of civil rights, it is in no way 
a violation of contract law. Such an act does not give rise to a cause of 
action in contract. It is not understood in those terms. Our contract 
law—both in doctrine and even more powerfully in theory—does not 
include any understanding that our choices to contract or not contract 
are in any way constrained, whether by the race of our potential co-
contractor or by any other factor.59 
But as Dagan and Dorfman argue, it should.60 The point of contract 
law, writ large, is to promote relational justice in our dealings with each 
other.61 We may be inclined to treat each other justly in the private realm 
for the most part. But we do not always, and when we do not, contract 
law itself should act as a corrective. Contract law exists, or should exist, to 
complete the circle of virtue: Because of various rules of contract law, our 
contracts will reinforce what is required of us by our obligation of 
relational justice. When we breach that obligation, contract law should 
step in to provide the remedy.62 
There are four steps to Dagan and Dorfman’s quite complex 
argument on this score, and each is important. The first step may be the 
least obvious but really should not be: to wit, that the duty not to 
discriminate is not a part of contract law.63 We do of course have a duty 
not to discriminate—this is why their point may be hard to see—but that 
duty owes its origins to federal antidiscrimination law, not to contract 
law itself. Again, contract law itself, traditionally understood, teaches 
something that is very much the opposite: Contract law rests, after all, 
on a firm foundational claim that we can undoubtedly refuse to contract 
with anyone we would rather not deal with and agree to contract only 
with those with whom we wish to deal. Contract law, in other words, 
follows Tom Buchanan: “I won’t sell you the car at all . . . . I’m under no 
obligations to you at all.”64 Consider your favorite contract law casebook. 
Is there a housing discrimination case in there? Is Lochner65 in there? Is 
the repudiation of Lochner included? From a doctrinal, as well as, 
theoretical contract law perspective, contract is understood, taught, 
studied, and theorized as though these duties simply do not exist. And, 
within contract law, they do not. They are part of our obligations toward 
the State, and therefore, toward our co-citizens. In other words, they are 
then imposed upon our contract choices from the outside; they stem 
                                                                                                                           
 59. See id. at 1402–03. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 1420. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 1399, 1439. 
 64. Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 90. 
 65. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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from our civil rights society, not from our contract law. They are not part 
of our relational obligations as conceived by contract law itself. 
The second step is what Dagan and Dorfman argue in the bulk of 
their article: Discriminatorily refusing to contract with someone on the 
basis of race is a refusal to treat those who we refuse to see as substantive 
equals, possessed of rights and capabilities of individual self-determination, 
and is therefore a violation of relational justice.66 It is not only then a 
violation of the respect and dignity we owe co-citizens by virtue of the 
great civil rights gains of midcentury. It is part of the respect and dignity 
we owe those with whom we deal, by virtue of the dictates of relational 
justice. It is part of the justice that is owed—but it is distinctive in that it is 
neither distributive justice nor social justice. It is the justice that should 
inform the relationships we are in, or the relationships we refuse to be in, 
through our commercial dealings.67 Again, this is a novel claim. It has not 
been made, or criticized. It has, to date, simply not had a hearing: We do 
not even approach it in our teaching and scholarship on contract law 
itself, and we do not approach it in our public law classes or scholarship 
likewise. It slips through the cracks of our traditional division of labor. 
Let me just underscore how doubly novel it is: We do not, in law schools, 
either in our teaching or scholarship, and for reasons which I have 
discussed at length elsewhere, discuss justice of any form as a constraint or 
as an ideal of our law. So the introduction of justice as a constraint on 
relationships and as an ideal for private law is itself novel. The 
conception of “relational justice”—a set of ideals and practices distinct 
from distributive and social justice, and very distinct from legal or 
horizontal justice68—is all the more so. Relational justice, as Dagan and 
Dorfman understand it, is the justice owed within our private dealings: It 
should constrain our behavior and guide our law.69 
The third claim Dagan and Dorfman make is that because the 
discriminatory refusal to deal with people of color when, for example, 
selling a home is a violation of relational justice, this refusal should 
therefore be cognized as a harm by contract law.70 Thus, the duty not to 
discriminate should be understood to be a duty that follows directly from 
contract law itself. The duty not to discriminate should not constrain 
contract behavior “from the outside”; it should not constrain contract 
because of an external obligation imposed by a different branch of law. 
                                                                                                                           
 66. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1440. 
 67. See id. at 1398–99. 
 68. Horizontal justice refers to the Aristotlean claim that justice requires the like 
treatment of likes or fair application of rules. The Politics of Aristotle paras. 1280a7--
1282a16, 1282b18--1282b23 (Peter L. Phillips Simpson trans., Univ. of N.C. Press 1997). 
 69. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1410 (“Private law addresses our 
interpersonal interactions by marshaling rights and obligations that take a relational 
form.”). 
 70. See id. at 1425 (describing traditional contract law doctrines that exclude persons 
unable to contract equally or fairly). 
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Rather, the duty should constrain contract behavior because it is a part of 
the core normative content of contract law itself: the construction of just 
private relations. Contract law exists, fundamentally, to ensure that our 
relations with each other are just. It does not exist fundamentally to 
further along the production of wealth, or to resolve prisoners’ dilemmas 
thus facilitating complex deals, or to maximize efficiency and minimize 
waste—although, no doubt, these are altogether desirable side benefits. 
It exists to further and promote justice—as does any body of law, 
although the form of justice is different in different branches of our 
liberal legal regime. 
The fourth and final step, then, is that the duty not to discriminate is 
not, but should be, understood as a basic rule of contract law and not just 
of the civil rights society.71 It should be as much a part of that body of law 
as the consideration doctrine, or the rules governing the offer and 
acceptance of deals, or the rules dictating damage awards. It should be 
understood as a part of our relational duties to co-citizens. Contract law 
exists fundamentally to ensure that our dealings are just. The duty not to 
discriminate is required by relational justice. The rule, then, not to 
discriminate in housing transactions should be, though it is presently not 
conceived to be, a basic tenet of contract law itself. Because it is not, 
contract law should be faulted.72 
Each step of this argument, and certainly the argument’s conclusion, 
distinguishes Dagan and Dorfman’s understanding of contract law and its 
ideals from both traditional and critical conceptions, and each underscores 
its stature as exemplary of new criticism. Moving quickly through these 
claims: first, that the duty not to discriminate is a function of public civil 
rights law and not of contract law itself.73 No one denies this, but only 
Dagan and Dorfman find it problematic. Traditionalists (both 
egalitarians and libertarians) locate the duty in public law; critics fault 
contract law and private law generally for obfuscating the subordination 
of vulnerable peoples,74 but they do not specifically fault private law for 
failing to recognize such a duty on the grounds eventually invoked by 
Dagan and Dorfman. Public law imposes duties and hence limits on 
contractual power, but no one—neither liberal egalitarians, nor 
libertarians, nor critics—aside from Dagan and Dorfman have even 
                                                                                                                           
 71. See id. at 1460. 
 72. See id. at 1439–40 (showing while traditionalists may concede that contractual 
freedom to discriminate may justifiably be imposed by outside constraints and critics may 
insist upon the necessity of doing so, neither group charges the seller with such a duty). 
 73. See id. at 1414–15. 
 74. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 5, at 999 (“Can we, in other words, expose the way 
law shapes all stories into particular patterns of telling, favors certain stories and disfavors 
others, or even makes it impossible to tell certain kinds of stories?”); Duncan Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 577–78 (1982) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives] (describing the failure of 
freedom of contract in traditional contract law to consider inequalities that exist). 
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stopped to point out that those limits should themselves be understood 
as a part of contract law or faulted contract law for not including them. 
Second, the Dagan and Dorfman claim that those limits not only are a 
function of what might be called a civil-rights morality, but also should be 
understood as implied by relational justice, is likewise made by neither 
camp.75 
The mandate that we should not discriminate is a function of the 
ethics of our interpersonal dealing, no less than is our obligation to keep 
our promises, once met. Nondiscrimination is a piece of interpersonal 
justice.76 Third, neither traditionalists nor critics come anywhere close to 
the assertion that interpersonal justice is the heart and purpose of 
contract law or that contract law is all about the enforcement of duties 
implied by relational justice. Contract law is not, if this is right, about 
either maximization of individual liberty or wealth or efficiency, as held 
by traditionalists,77 but nor is it about the mystification of financial or 
political or social power, as held by critics.78 It is about the pursuit of 
interpersonal justice. Thus, their final step: When contract law fails to 
include a foundational obligation of justice, it should be faulted.79 
Neither traditionalists nor critics have seen need to criticize private law 
on this ground. 
Dagan and Dorfman’s argument is truly as novel as they claim it to 
be. But I would go further: The power, centrality, and function of their 
general, affirmative claim—that contract law in particular, and private 
law generally, exists so as to further relational justice—put Dagan and 
Dorfman squarely in the center of the new legal critical movement. Like 
new legal critics generally, Dagan and Dorfman find the content of those 
ethical commitments that should guide our law, and hence our behavior, 
at the heart of law itself. This they share with other prominent new critics 
briefly named above: Professors Post and Siegel find dignitary ideals at 
the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, which they then use to criticize 
particular doctrinal developments they think have strayed too far from 
that path;80 Professors Zipursky and Goldberg (criticized by Dagan and 
Dorfman81) find the ethics of recourse in traditional tort law, which they 
then use as the foundation of their criticism of contemporary efficiency-
grounded understandings of tort.82 What distinguishes Dagan and 
                                                                                                                           
 75. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1440. 
 76. See id. at 1439. 
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 81. See Dagan and Dorfman, supra note 1 at 1413 n.88. 
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Dorfman from the others is what makes their work jurisprudentially 
significant: their insistence that those ethical commitments are best 
captured by a theory of justice, which is in turn informed by and 
produced by a particular body of law. In this claim they, like the other 
new legal critics in other areas of law, are on a fundamentally different 
path from both traditional understandings of private law and that of 
critical legal scholars. Unlike the former, Dagan and Dorfman find 
interpersonal justice, not efficiency or individual liberty, to be private 
law’s guiding norm. This is indeed, as they argue, utterly at odds with the 
traditionalist’s “division of labor” by which private law exists to promote 
the values of efficiency and wealth while concerns of social, and to a 
limited degree, distributive justice are relegated to the public sphere. 
And, it is even more clearly at odds with the assumptions of critical legal 
scholars: They find interpersonal justice, not mystification or hegemonic 
legitimation or obfuscation of private or capitalist power, to be private 
law’s overriding point. They find interpersonal justice, and not witting or 
unwitting collaboration with political constellations of economic power, 
to be that body of law’s raison d’être. Lastly, in some contrast with other 
new critics, although largely in step, Dagan and Dorfman articulate a 
deeper jurisprudence; they purport to find, and they then articulate, a 
theory of justice, obligating us in our quite personal as well as 
commercial relations. They find, in contract law, and in private law writ 
large, an imperative, backed by law, to treat each other justly—not just a 
value we might choose to abide. Justice, after all, is a command. When we 
shirk its obligations, we should be faulted, and perhaps legally sanctioned—
thus the role of law. When law abandons that imperative, it should be 
criticized—thus the role of criticism. 
III. THE LIMITS OF NEW LEGAL CRITICISM 
The limits of new legal criticism stem from the same premise as the 
source of its strength and distinctiveness: the foundational claim—
echoing Dworkin—that the discovery, or articulation, of law’s ideals come 
and should come from the substance of law itself. When the ideals are 
well grounded and admirable, but substantive law sometimes veers off 
track, that critique will work, as Just Relationships shows quite powerfully. 
Private law itself expresses an ideal of just relations, but it does not always 
honor that commitment (as in the case of its failure to enforce a duty not 
to discriminate), thus, the critique. But if the ideals are themselves 
flawed, so will be the critique. If the law from which the ideals emerge is 
immoral or amoral, so will be the critique. If the ideals are partial and 
stunted, so will be the critique. In the context of these authors’ concerns, 
if the concept of relational justice is limited, even at its most capacious, 
then so will be the critique. The critique will go beyond the law itself, and 
it will urge the law to go in new directions, but it will not stray far. 
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Sometimes, perhaps, more is called for. Sometimes, critique should cut 
deeper. 
The limits of new criticism is more than a logical or academic worry; 
it is inherent in the enterprise. It is, for example, what limits the ability of 
the common law to “self correct,” so to speak, to move in a more just 
direction. When the common law “works itself pure,” it does not always 
work itself more just, but sometimes to the contrary. A Herculean or 
Dworkinian judge who reaches across generations for a principled 
interpretation of law nevertheless has one foot firmly grounded in the 
past.83 That hobbles his legal mobility, to continue the Dworkinian 
metaphor. If common law is criticized—or if it simply evolves over time—
on the basis of ideals drawn from the common law, it will not move far 
from those possibly stunted or compromised or, at best, dated ideals. 
Dagan and Dorfman do insist—and rightly so—on viewing law broadly, as 
encompassing far more than its common law ancestry.84 This lessens the 
problem somewhat: The private law from which the ideals emerge is not 
the hoary principled law of tort and contract, but the complex world of 
the Uniform Commercial Code and consumer protective federal 
legislation for financial and household products both, minimum wage 
and maximum hours laws, and Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration regulations. If we understand contract law broadly, then 
the body of law to which we turn to discern its guiding ideals, whether of 
relational justice or something else, is considerably broader and possibly 
more just than were we to limit it to principles of individual liberty, 
laissez faire, and the creation of wealth, as they were articulated in a 
handful of mid-nineteenth century cases from two or three countries. 
But construing law broadly by no means eliminates the problem. 
The example Dagan and Dorfman give of the strengths of their new 
critical method also well illustrates the method’s limits. Again, Dagan and 
Dorfman want to reinterpret contract law (and private law more 
generally) so that the antidiscrimination norm is clearly implied by it, 
rather than a limit upon it. They do so by reading contract law as resting 
on a commitment to relational justice and then view the antidiscrimination 
norm as following directly from that commitment to justice—rather than 
as following solely from a commitment to, briefly, the civil rights society.85 
This is an exciting and fecund insight. But one reason for its fecundity is 
that it reveals a tension between contract ideology and the civil rights 
society—a tension that domesticating the antidiscrimination principle, by 
bringing it within the umbrella of contract, does not resolve. If relational 
justice requires nondiscrimination, which I believe it does, does it not 
require much more besides that, not so cleanly implied by any principle 
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 85. See id. at 1398, 1440–44. 
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of either public or private law? Relational justice requires 
nondiscrimination, Dagan and Dorfman argue, because relational justice 
requires that we treat those with whom we deal (or may deal) as 
substantive equals entitled to pursue their autonomously chosen, self-
determined ends.86 This seems compelling and important. But if it is 
compelling and important, does it not imply more than the 
antidiscrimination norm? 
The antidiscrimination norm, if we understand it conventionally as a 
constraint on contract law imposed by virtue of the civil rights society, 
civil rights movement, and civil rights commitments, restrains our 
contractual freedom and choices by disallowing choices made on 
grounds of race, so as to go some distance toward the elimination of 
racism in our societal dealings. It makes sense, then, to extend it, by way 
of reasoned elaboration either through statute or court decision, to 
other areas well understood as implicated by civil rights: gender 
discrimination, disability discrimination, and so on. But, if we want to 
understand it as a requirement of relational justice, rather than solely a 
requirement of the civil rights society, it has a quite different trajectory, 
and it should extend in very different ways. If we should not discriminate 
in our private commercial dealings because of our duty to regard others 
as substantive equals, then there are further constraints we should 
recognize as likewise implicated by this norm of justice. Do we not also 
violate the substantive equality of others when we fire them at will, for 
other irrational or indeed malicious reasons? Is it not a violation of the 
substantive equality of others when we refuse to hire for irrational or 
malicious reasons? In other words, if the antidiscrimination norm 
constrains contractual choice because it constitutes a failure to respect the 
substantive equality of others, and therefore violates our duty of 
relational justice (rather than constraining choice because it violates 
norms imposed upon contractual freedom by virtue of the civil rights 
society), then doesn’t the “at will” employment regime likewise constitute 
a failure to respect the substantive equality of others, and therefore 
violate our duty of relational justice as well? Transporting, so to speak, 
the antidiscrimination norm from its civil rights foundation and then 
importing it into contract law itself, by way of the norm of relational 
justice, surely has penumbral effects. Its gravitational pull shifts. What it 
pulls into the ambit is not other groups who have likewise borne the 
weight of various societal pathologies (women, immigrants, religious 
minorities), but rather other relational practices that reveal the same 
failure of regard for substantive equality. At-will employment seems to 
violate relational justice in precisely the way discriminatory practices 
violate relational justice if the latter is understood as infringing the 
victim’s substantive equality and self-determination. 
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This possibility is by no means a reductio ad absurdum complaint 
against Dagan and Dorfman’s argument. Quite the contrary: It seems to 
me a highly desirable and sensible extension of their argument. It 
resolves a tension that now exists between contractual norms of freedom 
and antidiscrimination norms of racial and sexual equality, felt both in 
theory and very much in practice in workplaces and perhaps in housing 
or rental markets as well: While employers cannot hire or fire or fail to 
promote on grounds of race or sex, they can do all of that and more on 
grounds of irrational and justified general animus. Dagan and Dorfman 
are right to say that we should indeed rethink private law so that these 
nondiscriminatory moral constraints upon contractual choice are 
understood as emanating from a relational, or private, conception of justice. 
That is a huge advance. Once we do so, we should see that other 
constraints also emanate from that relational conception and should be 
therefore understood as derived from contract law, rather than from 
constraints upon it.87 And if so, then other contractual practices, not just 
those that reflect racial bias, come into focus as profoundly unjust, as 
violations of the norm of relational justice and as, therefore, within the 
limits of contractual freedom by virtue of the ideology of contract itself 
rather than, again, by virtue of a constraint imposed upon it from 
another source of law or principle. 
The problem with that extension within the terms of Dagan and 
Dorfman’s project is that while it might be sound as a matter of moral 
principle, it is not at all clear that it is sound as a matter of legal principle. 
The new critical method commits us, after all, to locating the ideals that 
should guide legal critique and evolution from the text of law itself.88 It is 
imminently sensible to view that “law” from which the ideal should be 
derived as including constraints upon contract that emanate from civil 
rights laws. Then, the new legal critical method, and the authors’ 
substantive rewriting of private law to which it leads, can soundly locate 
the antidiscrimination principle in relational justice, which yields their 
result: Antidiscrimination is a foundational principle of contract law, not 
just a principle of public law imposed upon it. But—and this is the crux 
of my critical observation—it is not at all clear that there is any positive 
legal pronouncement that could similarly ground even skepticism of at-
will employment regimes. Yet, that regime seems as violative of relational 
justice as discriminatory contractual choices themselves, if the violation of 
relational justice occasioned by discrimination stems from our duty to treat 
others as substantive equals (rather than from our societal commitment to 
rid our lives of racism). So, while relational justice as Dagan and Dorfman 
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understand it seems to squarely target at-will market and employment 
practices, as well as discriminatory practices, it is not clear that their new 
legal critical method will generate enough positive law to justify the 
extension. The long and short of it: In The Great Gatsby, Tom gets away 
with his cruel and abusive mistreatment of Wilson after all.89 Lack of 
privity trumps the demands of relational justice, so long as they both are 
white. 
That, in a nutshell, seems wrong. It seems wrong both logically and 
normatively to conclude that the recognition of relational justice as the 
core of private law has the powerful effect of “pulling in,” so to speak, the 
antidiscrimination norm into the heart of contract, rather than placing a 
limit upon it, but then not insisting that the same concept of justice 
seemingly casts a shadow on other practices that seem similarly, if not 
equally, repugnant. To be clear, that Dagan and Dorfman’s conception of 
relational justice and private law reveals this striking paradox is a 
strength of their argument. From a civil rights perspective, it even seems 
terrible—an American tragedy, of sorts—to not extend our understanding 
of the antidiscrimination norm to include employment at will. We should 
indeed regard employment at will as an unrecognized civil rights 
violation. Dagan and Dorfman imply an argument with a similar 
conclusion regarding private law itself: It is an American tragedy, of 
sorts, to impose upon contractual freedom a nondiscrimination norm 
that does not extend to a demand that employers treat all employees 
and potential employees as substantive equals with rights to self-
determination. Their method, however, limits the power of the trans-
migration. There is no positive law supporting the proposition that the 
relational justice that is the point of private law renders employment at-
will regimes suspect. And that is a pity. 
CONCLUSION 
Just Relationships is an exciting work we should applaud. It opens the 
doors of moral imagination as well as the doors of legal perception. Its 
basic thesis—that private law exists to further the goals of relational 
justice—invites us to think about the justice we owe those with whom we 
transact business and to reflect on how, if at all, that justice forms the 
contours of our substantive law. It also raises many questions well beyond 
                                                                                                                           
 89. One of the most famous and damning lines in American literature recapitulates 
Fitzgerald’s stance: “They were careless people, Tom and Daisy—they smashed up things 
and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness, or 
whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had 
made . . . .” Fitzgerald, supra note 34, at 139–40. The mess they made, through the course 
of the novel, included several automobile accidents, Wilson’s suicide, and Gatsby’s murder. 
Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 139--40. See generally, Robin West, Gatsby and Tort, in 
American Guy: Masculinity in American Law and Literature 86 (Saul Levmore & Martha 
C. Nussbaum eds., 2014). 
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those posed above. What of mandatory arbitration? Does the recognition 
of relational justice as the point of private law cast light on the limits we 
should impose, as a matter of contract law itself, on this contractual 
practice? Does mandatory arbitration in effect have the consequence of 
prioritizing formal over substantive equality, and therefore of stripping 
contract of its moral grounding? Does a recognition of relational justice 
suggest a firm foundation for the much battered unconscionability 
doctrine that goes well beyond, and much deeper than, the various 
arguments recently raised on its behalf, grounded in a handful of 
cognitive biases discovered by behavioral psychologists and economists? 
Does relational justice have implications for family law, or should we try 
to articulate a different justice—perhaps, “intimate justice”—for that 
realm of life? Is there a distinctive form of justice—a sphere of justice, to 
borrow a now-familiar phrase—that animates other areas of law? Should 
we distinguish the relational justice we owe strangers, as reflected in tort 
law, from the relational justice we owe co-contractors or would-be co-
contractors, as reflected in contract law? Dagan and Dorfman blur 
contract and tort for these purposes, but perhaps we might better 
distinguish them ever more sharply. Perhaps tort rests on a related, but 
nevertheless different, understanding of justice than contract. 
Dagan and Dorfman uncover the lie in Tom Buchanan’s unequivocal 
declaration in The Great Gatsby that he owes Wilson nothing at all by virtue 
of a lack of privity. Tom Buchanan and Wilson were in a pattern of 
dealing that formed the foundation for duties they each had toward the 
other. They owed each other relational justice. Privity of contract, it turns 
out, does not limit the scope of relational justice even in private life. 
Much follows from that very straightforward observation not only for our 
law, and perhaps not even primarily for our law. Much follows for our 
private transactions, for our sense of the duties we have toward each 
other, for our conceptions of ourselves, and most importantly, for our 
understanding of community. Dagan and Dorfman have given us a place 
to start, and a way to proceed, in making much better sense of all of 
these obligations. 
 
